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Abstract
Objective. Moral judgments are based on decisions that take into account the representation of norms and law, 
values, functionality and situations themselves. Morality has been studied with “hypothetic moral dilemmas”, in 
order to identify the type of outcome and the process behind moral reasoning. But judgments by themselves are 
not enough to establish differences in the type of resolution or the relationship with other cognitive processes. 
The present paper aimed to compare performance in tasks of utility maximization, cognitive control, and moral 
judgments, taking into account sex and other sociodemographic variables. Method. Seventy-three university 
students participated (50 women, 20 men and 3 with unreported gender, the average age was 19.53 years (SD = 
1.68 years). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was used to identify behaviors of utility maximization. In addition, we 
used the switch costs and the web application of moral machine tasks. Results. A difference between variables 
of the IGT, but no differences in the switch costs task were found. Conclusion. Regarding moral judgment, 
males gave more value to respect norms than females. Some variables of the IGT task support outcomes related 
to differences between sexes. Results are congruent with differences shown in existing literature.
Keywords. Morality, judgments, decisions, utilitarianism, deontological.
Diferencias en las decisiones utilitarias 
y morales entre hombres y mujeres
Resumen
Objetivo. Los juicios morales se basan en decisiones que toman en cuenta la representación de las normas 
y la ley, los valores, la funcionalidad y la situación en sí. La moral se ha estudiado con “dilemas morales 
hipotéticos” para identificar el tipo de resultado y el proceso detrás del razonamiento moral. No obstante, 
los juicios en sí mismos no son suficientes para establecer diferencias en el tipo de resolución o la relación 
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con otros procesos cognitivos. Por lo anterior, el presente estudio buscó comparar el desempeño en tareas de 
maximización de la utilidad, control cognitivo y juicios morales, teniendo en cuenta el sexo y otras variables 
sociodemográficas. Método. Participaron 73 estudiantes universitarios (50 mujeres, 20 hombres y 3 con sexo 
no reportado, la edad promedio fue 19.53 años (DE = 1.68 años). El Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) se utilizó para 
identificar comportamientos de maximización de la utilidad. Además, el estudio empleó la prueba de cambios 
de tarea y la aplicación web Máquina Moral. Resultados. Se encontró una diferencia entre las variables de IGT, 
sin observar diferencias en la prueba de cambios de tarea. Conclusión. En cuanto al juicio moral, los hombres 
dieron más valor al cumplimiento de normas que las mujeres. Algunas variables de la tarea IGT apoyan las 
diferencias entre los sexos. Los resultados son congruentes con las diferencias mostradas por la literatura.
Palabras clave. Moral, juicio, decisiones, utilitarismo, deontológico.
Diferencias nas decisões utilitárias e 
morais entre homens e mulheres
Resumo
Escopo. Os juízos morais estão baseados em decisões que levam em conta a representação das normas e 
a lei, os valores, a funcionalidade e a situação concreta. A moral tem se estudado com “dilemas morais 
hipotéticos” para identificar o tipo de resultado e o processo detrás do razoamento moral. Mas os juízos em 
si não são suficientes para estabelecer diferencias no tipo de resolução ou a relação com outros processos 
cognitivos. Por tanto, o escopo de este estudo foi comparar o desempenho em tarefas de maximização da 
utilidade, controle cognitivo e juízos morais, levando em conta o sexo e outras variáveis sócio demográficas. 
Metodologia. Participaram 73 estudantes universitários (50 mulheres, 20 homens e 3 com sexo não reportado, 
a idade de média foi de19.3 anos, (DE = 1.68 anos). O Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) foi utilizado para identificar 
comportamentos de maximização da utilidade. Além, o estudo empregou a prova de mudança de tarefa e 
a aplicação web Máquina Moral. Resultados. Foi achada uma diferencia entre as variáveis de IGT, mas não 
há diferencias na prova de mudança de tarefa. Em quanto ao juízo moral, os homens deram mais valor ao 
cumprimento de normas que as mulheres. Algumas variáveis da tarefa IGT apoiam as diferencias entre os 
sexos. Conclusão. Os resultados são congruentes com as diferencias mostradas na literatura. 
Palavras-chave. Moral, juízos, decisões, utilitarismo, deontológico. 
Introduction
Studies about morality initially emerge in philosophy 
and it has been a field of multiple researchers with 
methods characteristic of the study of philosophy. 
There is an intersection with moral psychology and 
cognitive morality regarding decision making, but 
psychological perspective is closer to empirical 
research with humans in evaluation of hypothetical 
situations and outcomes. In this text, morality is 
assumed from an evolutionary perspective and more 
closely related to what is referred to as moral intuition 
(for more extended comprehension see Álvarez-
Díaz, 2015 and Churchland, 2012). Additionally, this 
view is framed by a theoretical model of five groups 
of universal moral intuitions proposed by Haidt, 
2007. These moral intuitions are harm, fairness, 
ingroup, authority, purity. 
From a psychological view, morality can be 
seen from different perspectives. First, as a higher 
order mental process that has the aim of overcoming 
incorrect maladaptive behavior (Paxton, Ungar, 
& Greene, 2012), making to use of empathy to 
others, more than simple impulse control (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001). Second, as a non-transgression of 
socially accepted norms; failure to comply could 
lead to intense feelings of shame and guilt, and 
could also lead to discrimination (Fontenelle, De 
Oliveira-Souza, & Moll, 2015; Harris & Corriveau, 
2011; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Harris, 2000) and 
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third, as a step forward from the pure utilitarian 
stance proposed by the philosopher John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873), who highlighted the usefulness 
of human decisions for the pragmatic acquisition of 
a greater good (Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, 
& Silani, 2014; Ryan, 2000), towards an intuitive 
and deontological position, described by Immanuel 
Kant (1724-1804) who sought the achievement of a 
greater good to the pragmatic or utilitarian, centered 
on the respect of universal rights, human obligations 
and personal duties (Kant, 1990).
Following an evolutionary perspective 
(Churchland, 2012; de Waal, 2005; 2008; Haidt, 
2007) it is clear that there are neuroanatomic, 
endocrine, genetic and epigenetic neural circuits 
related with social emotions, which in turn are 
based on behaviors such as moral decisions, 
which together with cultural patterns allow 
the performance of individuals in situations 
of uncertainty (Bernhard et al., 2016; Pascual, 
Rodrigues, & Gallardo-Pujol, 2013; Hoffman, 1994). 
In previous decades, economic, experimental and 
mathematical explanations of behavior, assumed 
that an individual only thinks about his own 
behavior, concerned exclusively with the result of 
his interactions, without taking into account the 
complexities given in social relationships where it 
is possible to negotiate, exercise coercion, weigh 
benefits, distribute opportunities and voluntarily 
share with others (Gintins, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 
2005). 
The distinct nature of the evolution of utilitarian 
and deontological (e.g., moral) decisions has been 
confirmed in neuroscientific studies. According 
to Greene (2009), human moral judgment can be 
explained by the theory of dual processing of moral 
judgment, where two interdependent neuronal 
systems are active, but anatomically separated. 
Following that theory, the moral judgement is 
the outcome of a quick distinction of whether a 
situation requires a strategy of a rational decision of 
a utilitarian type, or a strategy of a moral decision 
of the non-utilitarian or deontological type. This is 
consistent with the distinction made by Kahneman 
(2003) where he describes the process of making 
decisions in two systems. First, there is an intuitive 
system an affective assessment, non-awareness, 
with value and risk; and second, a deliberate system 
rational, with utilitarian hope, probabilities of 
winning and avoiding the risk.
On other hand, from the neuroanatomic point 
of view, this decision making process requires 
different abilities of cognitive control (executive 
functions, operative memory and attentional 
cost) widely associated with the functioning of 
dorsal structures in the prefrontal cortex (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Smith & Kosslyn, 2008). These brain 
areas are closely related with rational, utilitarian 
decision-making. Bechara et al. (1995) have shown 
the effects of brain damage on the prefrontal 
ventromedial structures, leaving the patients making 
poor decisions and with low-value adaptation 
in rational, utilitarian decisions, such as the Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Anderson, 1994). Thus, moral judgments can be 
assessed from utilitarian decisions and morals from 
deontological views. Although they are different 
in nature, both can have links with emotional and 
affective dimensions (Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 
2016).
The origin of utilitarian and deontological 
rationalities found in genetic and cultural co-
evolution could explain the existing differences 
between the actions and the moral feelings of 
women-female and men-male. Currently, studies 
have shown that there is a difference in the 
assessment of individuals according to their sex 
(Efferson & Glenn, 2018), and this can be explained 
by evolutionary pressure of species, relating this 
performance to the activation level of reward 
circuitry brain structures, both in humans and in 
others primates (Soutschek et al., 2017; Wilson et 
al., 2013).
Considering Hamilton’s Rule on altruist 
selection, cooperative behaviors and morals would 
be selected in groups when their costs are inferior 
to their benefits. In addition, the closeness of 
kinship in interactions is important for cost worth, 
as is exemplified in the following coefficient of the 
relationship between cost and altruistic benefit by 
kinship:
pb > c
Where p is the degree of kinship, b is the 
benefit obtained and c is the cost given in the 
altruistic interaction (Reeve & Keller, 1999). Thus, 
early experiences of parental recognition seem 
to end up creating differences in moral behavior 
between sexes, while children learn to expect 
different altruistic behaviors from their mothers 
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and their fathers, and therefore, between women 
and men (Silk, 2005). These conditions of group 
selection of altruistic behaviors by sex are evolving 
in humans and primates that share a similar social 
structure. It should be noted that among mammals, 
social behaviors of various kinds are presented 
(Churchland, 2012).
Research in primates (macaques, chimpanzees, 
bonobos and vervet monkeys) has found a 
matrilineal line of altruistic obedience and 
cooperation directed to females, whereas  young 
females cannot use utilitarian strategies against 
their own mothers (Chapais, 1992). This difference 
in the social response and functionality within the 
species (generation of a link between mother-child, 
for example) allows individuals to make different 
judgments or behave differently depending on their 
gender-based parenting. Thus, theories about sexual 
differences have been raised in the utilitarian and 
deontological moral decision-making.
Some studies have shown the existence of 
these differences, for example, findings on a 
criterion measuring higher altruistic exchange 
when female-female relationships occur (Solnick, 
2001); also, a major frequency of acceptance of 
altruistic exchanges on the part of females (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001). In an ultimatum game in which 
an offer should divide an amount of cash equitably 
between himself and others, women tend to offer 
more equitable distributions than men (Güth, 
Schmidt, & Sutter, 2007). Finally, it has been found 
that females tend to return more cash than males in 
experimental situations (Croson & Buchan, 1999). 
These results seem to suggest that altruistic behavior 
of males is more sensitive to contextual factors than 
for female behavior, possibly due to females feeling 
more aversion to unfair exchanges (deontologists), 
while men, base their decisions more on efficiency 
(utilitarians) if there are no influences given by 
social norms, altruistic incentives or punishments 
for selfish behavior (Christov-Moore et al., 2014).
However, studies that focus on sexual 
differences have used different methodologies, 
and in addition to not having consistently 
found neurophysiological and neuroanatomical 
differences, neither did they find genetic differences, 
which were the differences referred in experiments 
and correlational studies (Fine, 2011). As proposed 
by Christov-Moore et al. (2014) some studies have 
been show non-consistent with respect to how 
much men and women cooperate and are altruistic 
among themselves. The experimental methodologies 
can be seen as an explanation for this difference 
between men and women because they combine 
face to face interaction, in some cases, and strategic 
interaction with unknown persons in others. Thus, 
the conditions in the experimental interactions 
are different and can be related to variability. In 
addition, other studies have shown cognitive bias 
based in Likert-type scales, something that seems to 
confuse the severity of an aversive consequence or 
a risk of a choice, with the probability estimated of a 
positive or negative consequence to choice (Harris, 
Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006).
As mentioned before, the present study asked 
about the possible differences between utilitarian 
and deontological decision-making related to sex, 
with the aim to support a discussion about the 
existence of evolutionary and psychological reasons 
that characterize moral and altruistic human 
behavior. Thus, the interest of the investigation is the 
interaction in the performance between a utilitarian 
task (Iowa Gambling Task), a control cognitive task 
(switching task), and a deontological decisions task 
(moral machine task). 
Method
Participants
Seventy-three healthy college students (50 female, 
20 male; 3 genders unknown, Mage = 19.53 years, 
SDage = 1.68 years) were enrolled in the study. 
Inclusion criteria taken into account were student 
health, absence of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, and voluntary participation. Subjects 
were from two institutions (public and private) 
(see table 1). Their participation was anonymous, 
voluntary and without pay. None of the participants 
had previous knowledge of the tasks in the study. 
Recruitment was conducted using a snowball type 
sampling method. All procedures complied with 
national and international ethical guidelines for 
psychological research (American Psychological 
Association, 2002; Congreso de la República de 
Colombia , 2006) and were in accordance to the 
ethical requirements of the latest version of the 
Helsinki Declaration. All participants signed a 
written informed consent prior to participation in 
the study explaining the aim of research, scope, 
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benefit, duration, researchers responsible of 
observations and contact information. In addition, 
before finalizing the data collection, the participant 
explicitly sent us their data knowing that it would be 
processed for current research.
Instruments
Utilitarian decisions with the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT). 
The IGT was administered in order to assess deci-
sion-making under ambiguous conditions. In the 
current study, we used the IGT understanding utili-
tarian as the maximization of choice (Hernández, 
Denburg, & Tranel, 2009; Kornreich et al., 2013). A 
computer version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
was employed (Bechara et al., 1994). Briefly, the 
task consisted of 100 trials and in each of these the 
PD patients could choose one card out of four pos-
sible decks (decks A, B, C or D).  With each choice, 
the patient could add or subtract money from an 
initial amount ($2000) (Gansler, Jerram, Vannors-
dall, & Schretlen, 2011). The program of winning or 
losing was distributed in advantageous decks (C and 
D decks) associated with smaller wins ($50 per trial) 
and smaller losses. On the other hand, decks A and 
B were disadvantageous, characterized by larger 
wins ($100 per trial) and larger losses (Gescheidt et 
al., 2012). It was possible to assess the number of 
choices from the deck. The total score of IGT con-
sists in subtracting the disadvantageous decks from 
the advantageous ones (CD – AB). But, in addition, 
some studies suggest analyzing in five blocks of 20 
trials each one (trial 1-20 [Block A]; 21-40 [Block 
B]; 41-60 [Block C]; 61- 80 [Block D] and 81 – 100 
[Block E]) (Gansler et al., 2011).
Attentional cost using Switch Costs Task.
 
The switch cost task was implemented to assess 
how participants could quickly change between 
two types of task, each one demanding attention 
and previous training. Some studies suggest that 
switching between tasks may reflect the control 
processes that are engaged when participants 
needed to attend to two or more instructions (Wylie 
& Allport, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). We 
used the Switch Task similarly to previous studies 
(Cooper, Garrett, Rennie, & Karayanidis, 2015). 
Briefly, participants carry out two trials of task A, 
that consist in matching a letter stimulus with a 
keyboard, followed by two trials of task B where 
the participant is trained to find the location and 
response with a different keyboard; and then back to 
task A. Hence, a task switch occurs every two trials. 
The difficulty to switch between tasks is expressed 
as immediate slow down following a task switch.
All stimuli were presented on a black 
background and using the task programmed in 
the website PsyToolkit. Task cues were letters 
(consonants or vowels) and numbers (for example 
the combination G 1) and the participant should 
respond with keys “b” and “n” depending on the 
location of stimulus. Thus, if the location of the 
stimulus appeared at top of the screen the correct 
answer was typing a letter. In addition, at the top 
of the screen consonants could appear (G, K, M or 
R) which should be responded with the “b” key, or 
vowels may appear (A, E, I or U) which should be 
responded with the “n” key. On the contrary, if the 
location of the stimulus appeared at the bottom of 
the screen the correct answer was typing a number. 
In addition, if the number that appeared was odd (3, 
5, 7 or 9) the correct answer was the “b” key and if 
the number that appeared was even (2, 4, 6 or 8) the 
correct answer was the “n” key. 
Trials were staggered by a 500 milliseconds 
intertrial interval (ITI) and the task consisted of three 
blocks. The first: training the relationship location; 
the second block: training the relationship with cue; 
and third block: mixed to assess switching task. Each 
trial started with a task cue and finished when the 
participant gave an answer. After each response, the 
participant received a feedback (correct or error).
 
Deontological moral decisions using Moral 
Machine Task.
The moral machine is a website application that 
was designed to analyze the moral performance of 
participants through hypothetical situations with 
autonomous vehicles and pedestrians (Bonnefon et 
al., 2016; Kim et al., 2018). Although the current 
approach used a website application, this procedure 
followed the recommendations on moral dilemmas 
by including the participant in a situation with 
a finite number of answer options (Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012), but specifically focused on features 
of pedestrians preferred by participants.
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Briefly, the moral machine consisted of a 
situation (out of a total of 13) where the participant 
had two possibilities and must choose one of them, 
each one having a different ethical outcome. In each 
scenario or situation, a pedestrian was randomly 
chosen, pedestrian types ranged from kids or babies 
to older people, including animals and under 
different conditions (healthy, overweight, doctors or 
thieves among others). Likewise, the scenario could 
vary if the pedestrian follows a rule or not (crossing 
the street at a red light or during a green traffic light). 
At the end of thirteen scenarios, the participants 
saw their general outcomes, which reported the 
following data, preference by “save more lives”, 
“protect pedestrian”, “respect the law” and “do not 
intervene”. Moreover, the preferences across sex 
(male and female), species (animals or people), age 
(babies or elder), health (fitness or overweight) and 
social value (thief or doctor) were measured.
Procedure
The subjects were invited to participate in the study, 
and all tasks were performed individually on a 
computer. Initially, a sociodemographic survey was 
made and after the switch cost task, IGT and moral 
machine were performed. The time allotted for the 
application was approximately 30 min. 
Data Analysis
Descriptive results are presented as mean (M) or 
median (Mdn) ± standard deviation (SD) or standard 
error (SE). For each statistical test a p-value (two-
tailed) < 0.05 was considered significant, except 
where otherwise stated. Student t test and mixed 
ANOVAs with repeated measures were performed to 
assess performance across different tasks. The effect 
size was calculated with d Cohen by t-test and eta 
square (η2) by ANOVA. Spearman correlations were 
conducted to explore potential associations.
Results
Detailed results of the sociodemographic variables 
grouped by sex are presented in table 1. For initial 
analysis, data was taken by combination and 
then, compared by specific variables such as sex, 
religious belief and test performance of utilitarian 
and deontological decision-making.
Utilitarian decisions with the Iowa Gambling Task 
Initially, a separation by sex was carried out to 
evaluate the decision making in the IGT test. By 
calculating a student t-test, a significant difference 
was found between men and women in the total net 
score (t (25.39) = 2.34; p < 0.05; d = 0.68) showing 
Table 1
Sociodemographic variables 
Total Male Female Not indicated
Frequency 73 20 50 3
Age M(SD) 19.53 (1.68) 20.05 (1.82) 19.28 (1.61) 20.33 (1.15)
Program
     Legal and social sciences 68 18 47 3
     Health 2 1 1 -
     Basic sciences 1 1 - -
     Other 2 - 2 -
Place of residence
     Boyacá 46 12 34 -
     Bogotá 27 8 16 3
a large effect size between groups. Likewise, there 
was a higher score for men (M = 29.68; SEM = 9.74) 
than for women (M = 4.68; SEM = 4.31), suggesting 
a typical risky profile in men.
In the males performance, cards with the highest 
profit were chosen more often, even when the 
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similar to the responses of participants in other 
studies (Gescheidt et al., 2013; Kobayakawa, 
Tsuruya, & Kawamura, 2010; León, Martínez, Cruz, 
& Hernández, 2011). This in as much as the scores 
obtained were close to zero in differences between 
decks of cards (CD - AB), suggesting that choices 
made by participants followed random patterns, in 
an effort to find an optimal strategy.
Also, an analysis of variance was performed 
through an ANOVA of repeated measures with 
blocks of choices (1 to 5) as a within-subject factor. 
Sex was analyzed as a factor between subjects given 
a frequency of choice. However, the differences 
between choices that were illustrated by gender 
were not significant, nor did they have an effect on 
participants’ total scores (F (4, 268) = 0.14; p = 0.966), 
So, no interaction between decks sex was found (F 
(8, 260) = 0.51; p = 0.852). 
Likewise, no difference was found between 
participants’ scores of choice (total and by series) 
and their religious beliefs (atheist or believer). 
Finally, the IGT test was used to characterize 
participants’ choice in two possible outcomes: first, 
the risky decision (with frequent choice of cards 
with greater profit but also with greater loss (decks A 
and B); and second, the cautious decision, typical of 
the participants who frequently presented choices 
of cards with lower loss, but also with lower profit 
(cards C and D) (figure 1).
probability of losing large amounts of hypothetical 
money was greater. This result contrasts with the 
comparison of response time between different 
options (total response time, response time for 
secure options and response time for risky options); 
that is, although there were no significant differences 
between total response times and response times 
of safe cards (cards C and D), men demonstrated 
a tendency to take risky options (M = 1295.28 
milliseconds; SD = 540.26), compared with women 
(M = 1117.88 milliseconds; SD = 528.1), indicating 
a certain absence of impulsive decision-making in 
women.
Regarding tests trials, the amount of hypothetical 
money obtained was greater for men (M = 2960.52 
pesos; SD = 901.32) than for women (M = 2094.79 
pesos; SD = 775.77), with a large effect size between 
both sexes (t (65) = 3.93; p < 0.001; d = 1.02). It is 
worth noting that no male or female participant lost 
the initial monetary amount in test trials ($ 2000), 
indicating that both men and women chose good 
strategies for picking cards. However, cards chosen 
by men were more effective in gaining money than 
cards chosen by women.
When analyzing the IGT scores in trials 
(Gescheidt et al., 2012)dementia, executive 
dysfunction according to the Tower of London 
test and the Stroop test, or pathological gambling, 
participants were found to make random choices 
at the beginning of the tasks (block A). A finding 
Figure 1. IGT scores during the performance of five (5) blocks. * p < 0.05
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When performing an analysis of variance by 
mixed ANOVA, between-subject performance was 
taken as the total score (> 1 = “cautious” or < 1 
= “risky”) and as a within-subject factor, each of 
the blocks of cards to choose from in the trials was 
considered, finding a significant difference in terms 
of the classification factor (F(2, 67) = 39.65; p < 
0.001; η2 = 1.18). 
On the other hand, no difference was observed 
in the comparison between the different test blocks 
(F(4, 268) = 1.21; p = 0.303), although a difference 
in the interaction between blocks classification was 
found, with a small effect size (F(8, 268) = 8.42; 
p < 0.001; η2 = 0.25). These facts support the idea 
of differential performance among the subjects of 
each group. Thus, differences were found between 
net scores for each block, supporting the differences 
attributable to “risky” and “cautious” profiles of 
decisions.
As for other variables, there were no significant 
differences between the total response times of 
participants, nor between the response times to 
the risky decks (A and B) and the cautious ones (C 
and D). However, there was a significant statistical 
difference between the election profiles of the 
participants (t (64) = 6.84; p < 0.001; d = 1.71) the 
performance of the “cautious” profiles presenting a 
greater profit (M = 2901.4; SD = 851.51) compared 
to the ‘risky’ profiles (M = 1603.1; SD = 671.89) who 
ended up losing money below the initial $2000.
Attentional cost using Switch Costs Task
Descriptive results of the attentional change task 
are presented in table 2. Men and women’s scores 
from the attentional change task were compared, 
and only differences were found in the Mixed block 
Switch Error Rate task (U = 327, Z = -2.29, p = 
0.022). Among the other variables, there were no 
differences.
When comparing subjects who were classified 
as risky or cautious, there were only differences in 
performance with the Mixed block repeat speed task 
(U = 389, Z = -1.98, p = 0.047) (table 2). Following 
the comparison between atheist and believers, 
no differences were found in any of the variables 
of this attentional task (p > 0.05). When trying to 
correlate the scores of this test and the IGT scores, 
no significant relationships were found between the 
scores of both tests.
Table 2
Results of Switch Cost Task
Total Cautious Risky
M (n = 66) SD M (n = 34) SD M (n = 32) SD U (Z) p
Pure blocks speed 838.16 170.61 801.04 117.42     834.20 127.63 478 (-0.847) 0.39
Pure block error rate 5.30 6.98 3.88 3.78         5.16 5.09 436 (-1.39) 0.16
Mixed block switch speed 1608.04 324.79 1582.58 277.25   1625.50 319.85 482 (-0.795) 0.42
Mixed block repeat speed 1153.91 338.83 1067.38 242.75   1201.08 298.74 389 (-1.98) 0.04*
Mixed block repeat error rate          5 8.57 3.97 6.93         6.56 10.42 507 (-0.522) 0.60
Mixed block switch error rate 11.02 11.08 8.97 9.59       13.59 12.65 423 (-1.57) 0.11
Deontological moral decisions using Moral 
Machine Task 
The scores of moral decisions were analyzed 
according to previous division. This is because one 
of the objectives of the study was to evaluate moral 
decision-making, so the nine variables reported by 
the Moral Machine website were analyzed.
Thus, a scale was created with values between 
-7 (does not matter) to 7 (it matters a lot) to locate 
the responses of the subjects in the variables “save 
more lives”, “protect passengers”, “respect the law” 
and “do not intervene.” Similarly, the preference 
was reported according to the subjects’ choice 
between the variables of “preference by gender” 
(male or female), “preference by species” (human 
or animal), “preference for age” (elderly or baby), 
“preference for being fit” (large people or people 
in shape) and “preference for social value” (lower 
value and greater social value) (table 3).
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Table 3 
Results of Moral Machine
Save more lives 
(n = 72)
Protect passengers 
(n = 72)
Respect the law
(n = 72)
Do not intervene
(n = 72)
Mdn 7 -1 2 0.5 
Type of 
behavior
Cautious Risky Cautious Risky Cautious Risky Cautious Risky
Mdn
(SD)
7
(2.64)
7
(3.45)
-1
(3.65)
-1.25 
(3.02)
3
(3.04)
1.25 
(3.35)
0.5 
(2.01)
0.5 
(2.53)
Sex Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Mdn
(SD)
7
(2.75)
7
(3.18)
-1.25
(3.98)
-1 
(3.18)
3.5 
(2.49)
2 
(3.41)
0.5 
(1.91)
0.5 
(2.31)
Choice
Preference for 
gender
Preference for 
Species 
Preference for 
Age 
Preference for 
Fitness 
Preference for 
Social Value 
Mdn 2 -7 -3 0 -7 
Type of 
behavior
Cautious Risky Cautious Risky Cautious Risky Cautious Risky Cautious Risky
Mdn
(SD)
3.5 
(3.59)
1.5 
(4.32)
-7
(5.46)
-7
(4.97)
-7
(4.59)
-2 
(4.13)
0
(5.01)
0 
(5.63)
-7
(4.98)
-2 
(5.87)
Sex Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Mdn
(SD)
1.75 
(3.72)
2.75 
(4.37)
-7
(6.09)
-7
(4.92)
-2.25 
(5.09)
-5.25 
(4.13)
-7
(5.31)
0 
(5.18)
-7
(5.39)
-7 
(5.63)
Note. Although the measurement of these variables was done with the scale from -7 to 7, the extreme values of the variables were: preference for gender (-7 
= male; 7 = female), preference for the species (-7 = humans; 7 = animals), preference for age (-7 = babies; 7 = elder), preference for being fit (-7 = fitness; 7 
= heavy people) and preference for social value (-7 = greater social value; 7 = lower social value).
Figure 2. Performance in moral decisions between male and female.  ** p < 0.05
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When grouping the IGT scores and comparing 
the groups (cautious and risky) in the morality tests 
using the Mann-Whitney U test, no differences were 
found between the individuals in any of the variables 
of moral behaviors (p < 0.05s). Nor were differences 
found in the comparison for the same test between 
people calling themselves “atheists” and those self-
styled “believers”. However, when the comparison 
was made by sex, a difference was found between 
men and women for the variable of “importance for 
respecting the law” (U = 332.5, Z = -2.09, p = 0.036), 
presenting a median of greater importance for men 
(Mdn = 3.5, SD = 2.49) compared to women (Mdn 
= 2, SD = 3.41) (figure 2). Thus, the homogeneity of 
the scores in the case of men could show a trait of 
social desirability dependent on sex (figure 3).
Figure 3. Correlation between age and Mistakes.
Discussion
The main goal of the study was to compare the 
performance in tasks with a utilitarian component, 
considering cognitive and deontological control 
according to sex, as a way to establish possible 
differences around decision-making at different 
levels. Results showed differences between the 
utilitarian choices of men and women in a similar 
way to those found in studies in which men tend 
to present more predilection for risky alternatives 
(Hillier & Morrongiello, 1998). On other hand, 
other studies have found that men and women 
have ambiguous choice contexts and high risk 
(Derevensky & Gupta, 2006), presenting in turn 
a greater confidence in situations of potential risk 
(Pulford & Colman, 1997). Likewise, results are in 
line with those reported in meta-analysis done by 
Charness & Gneezy (2012), showing that men have 
lower risk aversion than women.
Furthermore, results showed less attention to 
risky options in the Iowa test completed by women, 
something consistent with other studies: given 
a greater risk aversion in the behavior of choice 
(Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), as well as a greater 
aversion to ambiguous decisions (Schubert, Gysler, 
Brown, & Brachinger, 2000).
Also, greater female sensitivity to pressures for 
money has been documented (Paserman, 2007); 
in addition, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch 
(2001) indicate the possibility that risky utilitarian 
decisions may generate different responses 
between both sexes. Similarly, it has been found 
that women take risks more seriously than men, 
since men tend to seek risks in their decisions in 
greater proportion; it is easier to persuade them to 
make decisions with high ambiguity. Harris et al. 
(2006) found important differences in the utilitarian 
decision making given between men and women, 
with respect to behaviors such as betting, engaging 
in high-risk behaviors and estimating in different 
ways the probability of negative consequences with 
respect to interacting with other people, engaging 
in risky acts, expecting negative consequences and 
enjoying these experiences.
While in the present study men presented better 
choice strategies, even in situations of risk, both 
women and men showed optimal gains in the Iowa 
test. However, no differences were found between 
men and women with respect to preferences for 
blocks of choice in the test. Be that as it may, there 
is a tendency for men to be more willing to learn 
the unpredictable pattern of losses generated by the 
IGT test.
With respect to the attentional cost tests, only 
differences by sex were found in the execution of 
the sub-tests that presented uncertainty conditions 
to change attentional expenditure and cognitive 
control, such as the sub-test Mixed block switch 
error rate and the Mixed block repeated speed 
subtest (Cooper et al., 2015). These results confirm 
those who found differences between the sexes with 
respect to the preference for tasks involving choices 
under ambiguous conditions, although in the study 
the relationships between performance in the Iowa 
task and the attentional cost tests were inconclusive. 
Thus, results of the present study do not present 
differences in cognitive control attributable to sex, 
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as has been the case raised by Miller & Halpern 
(2014), about how inconclusive studies have been 
about cognitive differences in attention and memory, 
attributable to sex and hormonal influence.
With respect to evidence of moral decisions, 
only differences by sex were found with respect to 
the “importance of respecting the law” condition, 
that being a moral norm that was observed to be of 
greater relevance for men. Deontological decisions 
for the most part, did not allow verification of 
expected differences, according to which men 
could have presented less moral inclination toward 
altruistic and cooperative behaviors, in comparison 
to women. Moral imperatives on life, respect for 
others, and respect for the other sex did not show 
any difference between the sex of participants. 
Reasons for a greater male preference for the law 
could be explained by a greater predisposition on 
the part of men to give value to moral and altruistic 
behaviors as long as they are prescribed by a social 
norm or other additional factors (Christov-Moore 
et al., 2014). This is what Elster (1989) considered 
as the tendency given in a social context to give 
permission for social norms to prevail over self-
interest, changing the judgment and evaluation 
given on how much an individual loses by breaking 
the rule.
A dual theory about moral judgment remains 
relevant, even though in the present study not all 
the differences and distinctions considered initially 
were shown. A difference between sexes was 
presented in utilitarian decisions. As the dual model 
of the Moral Judgment of Greene (2009) proposes 
a quick distinction on a dilemmatic situation, 
part of the cerebral cortex quickly proposes a 
utilitarian solution that can be optimal, with the 
appropriate affective and emotional attitudes, 
something demonstrated in the present study to a 
greater extent in men. According to Greene (2009), 
this distinction would be mediated initially by the 
activity of the anterior cingulate cortex. And to 
activate the utilitarian decision, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cerebral cortex and the inferior parietal 
lobe would be involved. The neuroanatomy of 
utilitarian decisions is supported in several studies 
(Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1999; Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 
2001; Grattan & Eslinger, 1992; Heekeren et al., 
2005; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Salzman, Britten, & 
Newsome, 1990).
In turn, the activation of deontological moral 
reasoning would involve, to a greater extent, the 
functioning of the medial prefrontal cerebral cortex, 
the posterior cingulate cortex, and the temporo-
parietal cerebral intersection, findings that are 
also supported by a variety of neurophysiological 
studies (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 
2003; Blair, 1995; Greene, 2009; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; 
Kedia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 2008; 
Peng, Jiao, Cui, Chen, & Li, 2017; Robertson et al., 
2007; Schaich-Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Schaich-Borg, Lieberman, 
& Kiehl, 2008; Yang, Raine, Narr, Lencz, & Toga, 
2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007; 
Young & Saxe, 2008).
Thus, the utilitarian reasoning would be similar 
to the system of deliberate thinking proposed by 
Kahneman (2012), as the one who decides based 
on estimated and weighted probabilities, hoping to 
obtain a marginal individual gain in the decision. 
Deontological moral reasoning would consist of 
the intuitive system of thought also proposed by 
Kahneman, which seems to make possible the 
social and affective heuristics that enable altruistic 
and cooperative behaviors automatically, while 
inhibiting deliberate decisions for such a case. 
This deontological moral reasoning could be what 
Kitcher (2010) called psychological altruism, given 
in adopting psychological attitudes centered not 
on the subjective personal perception, but on the 
perceptions, interests and actions of the other.
In future research, the robust measurement of 
deontological moral behaviors will be considered 
according to methodologies evincing the current 
social norms for the participants, as well as 
possible experiments of interaction between the 
decisions of such participants. This, in as much 
as the test of moral decisions used here, could 
be only tangentially linked to the deontological 
judgments of the participants. A potential limitation 
of the current study was not having a comparison 
with moral dilemmas traditionally used in moral 
decisions (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). However, 
it is noteworthy that the studies in moral judgments 
that have been carried out in recent years make use 
of technology, like virtual reality and hypothetical 
situations, taking into account additional variables 
to the known intentions of  participants (Caruana, 
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Spirou, & Brock, 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Patil, Calò, 
Fornasier, Cushman, & Silani, 2017; Patil et al., 
2016; Sütfeld, Gast, König, & Pipa, 2017). 
These modifications may not necessarily sepa-
rate the process fundamental to the moral decisions 
made based on situational dilemmas, as previously 
proposed, but it is important to standardize the 
methods used to favor the validations of outcomes. 
This suggests that research in the field of morality 
should use these types of tools to explore the moral 
judgment of individuals with instruments of high 
ecological validity, in order to overcome some of 
the biases found in moral judgment measurement 
(Bocian & Wojciszke, 2014). Recently, some studies 
have come out showing the functionality of the 
moral machine as a instrument to assess preferences 
by people through moral situations (Awad et al., 
2018; Maxmen, 2018).
In conclusion, in this study a difference was 
found regarding the assessment of norms by men 
and women through a situation of moral judgments. 
However, no difference was found in tasks of utility 
and executive control related with moral reasons, 
nor was a difference found in terms of variables such 
as religious beliefs. Results are consistent with a 
wide range of studies that evaluate the performance 
of the subjects taking into account sex, considering a 
combination between functionalist, anatomical and 
evolutionary points of view of moral psychology.
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ilustración? España: Universidad de Valencia.
Kedia, G., Berthoz, S., Wessa, M., Hilton, D., & 
Martinot, J. L. (2008). An Agent Harms a Victim: 
A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Study on Specific Moral Emotions. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(10), 1788–1798. 
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2008.20070
Kim, J. N. & Shadlen, M. N. (1999). Neural Correlates 
of a Decision in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex of the Macaque. Nature Neuroscience, 
2, 176 - 185. doi: 10.1038/5739
Kim, R., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Abeliuk, A., Awad, E., 
Dsouza, S., Tenenbaum, J., & Rahwan, I. (2018). 
A Computational Model of Commonsense 
Moral Decision Making. Retrieved from http://
arxiv.org/abs/1801.04346
Kitcher, P. (2010). Varieties of Altruism. Economics 
and Philosophy, 26(2), 121–148. doi: 10.1017/
S0266267110000167
Kobayakawa, M., Tsuruya, N., & Kawamura, M. 
(2010). Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment in 
Parkinson’s Disease: An Analysis of Behavioral 
Patterns Using a Modified Version of the 
Iowa Gambling Task. Parkinsonism & Related 
Disorders, 16(7), 453–457. doi: 10.1016/j.
parkreldis.2010.04.011
Kornreich, C., Brevers, D., Ermer, E., Hanak, C., 
Verbanck, P., Campanella, S., & Noel, X. (2013). 
Polysubstance Dependent Patients Display a 
More Utilitarian Profile in Moral Decision-
MORAL DECISIONS BETWEEN SEXES 59
Making than Alcohol-Dependent Patients, 
Depressive Patients and Controls. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 132(3), 434–440. doi: 
10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2013.03.005
León, F. G., Martínez, J. M. A., Cruz, J. S. y 
Hernández, L. M. (2011). Emoción y toma de 
decisiones: teoría y aplicación de la IOWA. 
Revista Electrónica de Psicología Iztacala, 
14(1), 333–353. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. 
K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as Feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 267–286.
Maxmen, A. (2018). Self-Driving Car Dilemmas 
Reveal that Moral Choices are not Universal. 
Nature, 562, 469–470. doi: 0.1038/d41586-
018-07135-0
Miller, D. I. & Halpern, D. F. (2014). The New 
Science of Cognitive Sex Differences. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 18(1), 37–45. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2013.10.011
Miller, E. K. & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An Integrative 
Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 24(1), 167–202. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167
Pascual, L., Rodrigues, P., & Gallardo-Pujol, D. 
(2013). How does Morality Work in the Brain? A 
Functional and Structural Perspective of Moral 
Behavior. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 
7, 1 – 8. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2013.00065
Paserman, M. D. (2007). Gender Differences in 
Performance in Competitive Environments: 
Evidence from Professional Tennis Players. 
SSRN Electronic Journal. 1 - 58. doi: 10.2139/
ssrn.997269
Patil, I., Calò, M., Fornasier, F., Cushman, F., & 
Silani, G. (2017). The Behavioral and Neural 
Basis of Empathic Blame. Scientific Reports, 
7(1), 1 - 14. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-05299-9
Patil, I., Cogoni, C., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L., & 
Silani, G. (2014). Affective Basis of Judgment-
Behavior Discrepancy in Virtual Experiences of 
Moral Dilemmas. Social Neuroscience, 9(1), 94 
– 107. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2013.870091
Patil, I., Zanon, M., Novembre, G., Zangrando, N., 
Chittaro, L., & Silani, G. (2016). Neuroanatomical 
Basis of Concern-Based Altruism in Virtual 
Environment. Neuropsychologia, 116, 34 – 43. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.02.015
Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., & Greene, J. D. (2012). 
Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment. 
Cognitive Science, 36(1), 163–177. doi: 
10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01210.x
Peng, X., Jiao, C., Cui, F., Chen, Q., & Li, P. (2017). 
The Time Course of Indirect Moral Judgment 
in Gossip Processing Modulated by Different 
Agents. Psychophysiology, 54(10), 1459–1471. 
doi: 10.1111/psyp.12893
Pulford, B. D. & Colman, A. M. (1997). 
Overconfidence: Feedback and Item Difficulty 
Effects. Personality and Individual Differences, 
23(1), 125–133. doi: 10.1016/S0191-
8869(97)00028-7
Reeve, H. K. & Keller, L. (1999). Levels of Selection: 
Burying the Units-of-Selection Debate and 
Unearthing the Crucial New Issues. In Levels of 
Selection in Evolution (pp. 3–14). Princenton: 
Princeton University Press.
Robertson, D., Snarey, J., Ousley, O., Harenski, 
K., DuBois-Bowman, F., Gilkey, R., & Kilts, 
C. (2007). The Neural Processing of Moral 
Sensitivity to Issues of Justice and Care. 
Neuropsychologia, 45(4), 755–766. doi: 
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.08.014
Rogers, R. & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a 
Predictable Switch Between Simple Cognitive 
Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology 
General, 124(2), 207–231. doi: 10.1037/0096-
3445.124.2.207
Ryan, A. (2000). The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill 
(2 ed.). Amherst: Humanity Books.
Salzman, C. D., Britten, K. H., & Newsome, W. T. 
(1990). Cortical Microstimulation Influences 
Perceptual Judgements of Motion Direction. 
Nature, 346, 174 - 177. doi: 10.1038/346174a0
Schaich-Borg, J., Hynes, C., Van Horn, J., 
Grafton, S., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006). 
Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors 
in Moral Judgments: An FMRI Investigation. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(5), 803–
817. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.5.803
Schaich-Borg, J., Lieberman, D., & Kiehl, K. A. (2008). 
Infection, Incest, and Iniquity: Investigating 
the Neural Correlates of Disgust and Morality. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(9), 
1529–1546. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2008.20109
Schubert, R., Gysler, M., Brown, M., & Brachinger, 
H. W. (2000). Gender Specific Attitudes 
CÉSAR A. ACEVEDO-TRIANA, JUAN FRANCISCO MUÑOZ OLANO Y PABLO REYES60
Towards Risk and Ambiguity: An Experimental 
Investigation. Zürich: Center for Economic 
Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. 
Silk, J. B. (2005). The Evolution of Cooperation in 
Primate Groups. In H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. 
Boyd, & E. Fehr (Eds.), Moral Sentiments and 
Material Interests (pp. 43–75). London: MIT 
Press.
Smith, E. E. & Kosslyn, S. M. (2008). Procesos 
ejecutivos. En E. E. Smith & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), 
Procesos Cognitivos: Modelos y bases neurales 
(pp. 293–339). Madrid: Pearson - Prentice Hall.
Solnick, S. J. (2001). Gender Differences in the 
Ultimatum Game. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 
189–200. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.
tb00060.x
Soutschek, A., Burke, C. J., Beharelle, A. R., 
Schreiber, R., Weber, S. C., Karipidis, I. I., … 
Tobler, P. N. (2017). The Dopaminergic Reward 
System Underpins Gender Differences in Social 
Preferences. Nature Human Behaviour, 1, 819 
- 827. doi: 10.1038/s41562-017-0226-y
Sütfeld, L. R., Gast, R., König, P., & Pipa, G. (2017). 
Using Virtual Reality to Assess Ethical Decisions 
in Road Traffic Scenarios: Applicability of Value-
of-Life-Based Models and Influences of Time 
Pressure. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 
11, 1–13. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00122
Wilson, M. E., Bounar, S., Godfrey, J., Michopoulos, 
V., Higgins, M., & Sanchez, M. (2013). Social 
and Emotional Predictors of the Tempo 
of Puberty in Female Rhesus Monkeys. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 38(1), 67–83. doi: 
10.1016/j.psyneuen.2012.04.021
Wylie, G. & Allport, A. (2000). Task Switching 
and the Measurement of “Switch Costs”. 
Psychological Research, 63(3–4), 212–233.
Yang, Y., Raine, A., Narr, K., Lencz, T., & Toga, 
A. (2006). Amygdala Volume Reduction in 
Psychopaths. Paper Presented at the Annual 
Meeting in the Society for Research in 
Psychopathology.
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. 
(2007). The Neural Basis of the Interaction 
between Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences , 104(20), 8235–8240. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.0701408104
Young, L. & Saxe, R. (2008). The Neural Basis 
of Belief Encoding and Integration in Moral 
Judgment. NeuroImage, 40(4), 1912–1920. 
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.057
Para citar este artículo / To cite this article / Para citar este artigo: Acevedo-Triana, C. 
A., Muñoz-Olano, J. F. & Reyes, P. (2019). Differences on Utilitarian and Moral Decision 
Between Male and Female. Pensamiento Psicológico, 17(1), 45-60. doi:10.11144/
Javerianacali.PPSI17-1.dumd
